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Abstract
I demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist
about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can
choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to
connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but
God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once
the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by
the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences
depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I
conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this inter-
pretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both
historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of
nature’, and when understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism and his
Critical conception of freedom.
Introduction
In this article I argue that the pre-Critical Kant has an intellectualist rather
than a voluntarist conception of God, and that once this is understood
it becomes clear that Kant is essentialist about relational properties. This
aligns Kant with the rationalist theological tradition running through
Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. In this tradition we find a conception of
the divine intellect rather than the divine will as the source of laws of
nature. This is a conceptual texture that has been overlooked in recent
discussions of the role of God in the emergence of the notion of a law of
nature, with a tendency to focus exclusively upon a voluntaristic God
commanding contingent laws. As well as being crucial for grasping
Kant’s pre-Critical position on the status of dispositional and relational
properties, conceptual textures uncovered in Kant’s early philosophy have
suggestive implications for how we might understand aspects of Kant’s
transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom.
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By ‘intellectualism’ I mean the view that the divine will is constrained
by the structure of reason, within which are contained all possible
combinations of properties, which constitute the essences of things; and
by an ‘essentialist view of relational properties’, I mean that although
God can choose whether or not to create a particular substance, and
whether or not to place it in connection with other substances, God
cannot choose all the relational properties of a substance, some of which
are fixed by its essence.1 Although commentators such as Laywine (1993:
37–42), Scho¨nfeld (2000: 149–54), Langton (2004: 107–23), and Watkins
(2005: 149–55) correctly identify the importance of God in creating
and connecting substances, there is not as yet a systematic treatment of
the early Kant’s intellectualist conception of God, and of its wider
implications. This article seeks to fill this gap.
In the first section of the article, I set out Kant’s pre-Critical position, which
is generally well-understood in the literature, that without the divine mind
there would be no community between substances, because substances
would not have (actual) relational properties. As we will see, without such
a community between substances, Kant considers that there would be no
space, and no change, succession, or causation between substances.
In section 2, I set out two fundamental models for how to construe this
dependence of the creation upon the divine mind, both of which have
venerable theological genealogies. One model emphasizes the freedom of
God to create the relational properties of substances according to his
arbitrary will, such that the same substance could have different relational
properties if God so wills. This conception forges a link between a
voluntaristic conception of God and a commitment to contingent laws of
nature. The alternative ‘intellectualist’ account restricts the freedom of the
divine will to the choice of whether or not to create a substance, such that
the relational properties of the substance are to some extent fixed by the
nature or essence of that substance, where these essences are contained
within the divine understanding. In the process of outlining these two
models, I will set out more precisely what I mean by ‘essentialism’ and
‘intellectualism’, and how these relate to the characterization of properties
as intrinsic, extrinsic and/or relational. We will see why Langton is
tempted to ascribe to the pre-Critical Kant a voluntarism about God, with
a contingent conception of the laws of nature, but why this neglects
significant interpretative possibilities, fully explored in section 3.
In section 3, I do the substantive interpretative work of demonstrating
that the early Kant is intellectualist about God, and essentialist about
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relational properties. It should be noted that my task is Kant exegesis
rather than philosophical reconstruction; I do not seek to defend Kant’s
intellectualism and essentialism, but simply to understand his position,
and to set out the supporting reasons he explicitly provides in his texts.
Other commentators have offered extensive reconstructions and cri-
tiques of some of the texts discussed, and I refer to this literature at
appropriate points, intervening only on exegetical points. That said, in
the fourth section, I briefly gesture towards some possible implications
of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by
God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of
‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism
and his Critical conception of freedom.
1. Kant in Context: The Divine Mind and the Metaphysics
of Real Relations
From an early stage in his thought, under the influence of Martin
Knutzen, Kant adhered to key Newtonian principles,2 albeit putting
them in a metaphysical key: in particular, the principles of inertia
and real causation. The notion of real causation between substances
was under pressure in Kant’s context because of perceived problems
with the discredited scholastic ‘way of influence’, which posits some-
thing passing ‘from one substance into another’ (Leibniz 1998b: 192).
Leibniz rejects the notion that an accident could ‘migrate’ between
substances, as ‘monads have no windows through which anything
could come in or go out y accidents cannot detach themselves and
stroll about outside of substances’ (1998c: 268). Although Kant
attempts to restore a notion of real causation, he is also anxious to
‘exclude’ this conception of ‘physical influence’ (Kant 1992: 44, NE 1:
415), sharing Leibniz’s conviction that ‘the action of one substance
upon another is not an emission or a transplantation of an entity’
(1998a: 152). Accordingly, much of Kant’s early thought can be
understood as a preoccupation with two tasks: first of all, defending
the principles of inertia and real causation against the opposition of
thinkers such as Leibniz, Baumgarten, and Wolff; secondly, protecting
these same principles against the support of thinkers such as Knutzen
and Crusius, who defended real causation, but from Kant’s point of
view, on erroneous grounds.3
Kant is keen to avoid the implication that substances stand in relation
to one another by virtue of their existence alone: this, he thinks, is a
mistake made by the scholastic ‘way of influence’, and repeated by both
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
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Knutzen and Crusius (see below). For Kant, it is only by virtue of the
divine will that substances stand in relation to one another. In what
follows, I will set out some key passages where Kant describes this
dependence upon a divine decision. God has a choice whether or not
to connect substances, and unless God does so connect substances,
there are no real relations. I will look in turn at Living Forces (1747), at
the principles of succession and coexistence in A New Elucidation
(1755), and at the Physical Monadology (1756). When attending, in
section 3, to the intellectualist dimension of the divine mind, and the
limitations placed on the scope of the divine will, I will also consider
evidence from The Universal Natural History (1755) and The Only
Possible Argument (1763).
In his earliest work Living Forces (1747) Kant insists that it is possible
for substances to exist without any external relations with others,
which is to say that substances are not in connection with one another
by virtue of their mere existence alone:
A substance is either in connection and relation with another
substance outside of itself, or it is not. Because any self-
standing being contains the complete source of all its deter-
minations in itself, therefore it is not necessary to its being that
it stand in connection with another thing. Therefore substances
can exist and nonetheless have no external connection at all
with other substances, or they can stand in a real connection
with other substances. (LF 1: 21–2)
For there to be a ‘world’ we require substances to be in connection with
one another. Given that it is possible for things to exist without being in
connection, it is therefore possible for substances to exist, but not to
belong to a world. Equally, it is possible that substances are connected
with each other, but not with this world, such that there exists another
world. Kant criticizes the view, propounded in the ‘lecture halls’, that
‘there could not exist more than a single world’ (LF 1: 22). It is ‘really
possible’ that ‘God has created many millions of worlds’ (LF 1: 22). It
remains ‘undecided whether they really exist or not’, and we commit
the mistake of thinking otherwise because we fail to understand that we
only have a world when things ‘stand in a real connection with other
things’ (LF 1: 22).
In his 1755 work the New Elucidation Kant sets out two principles
‘extremely rich in consequences’: the principles of succession and
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coexistence (Kant 1992: 37; NE 1: 410). The ‘principle of succession’
asserts that no substance has the power to change itself:
No change can happen to substances except in so far as they
are connected with other substances; their reciprocal depen-
dence on each other determines their reciprocal changes of
state. (Kant 1992: 37; NE 1: 410)
Without this ‘connection of substances’, ‘succession and time would
likewise disappear’ (Kant 1992: 37; NE 1: 410). As Laywine points out
(1993: 36), we see here something like the Newtonian principle of
inertia applied at a more fundamental level: more fundamental, because
Kant is not just describing a truth about matter, but about any sub-
stances whatsoever.4 The Newtonian conception of force ‘presupposes
place, direction and change’, whilst for the early Kant, ‘force applies in
more spheres than bodies’, and includes, for example, ‘a change of
perception in a soul’ (Laywine 1993: 36).
Kant distinguishes his position from the ‘system of physical influx’
(1992: 44; NE 1: 415), and Leibnizian pre-established harmony,
represented in the ‘Wolffian philosophy’ (1992: 38–9; NE 1: 411–12).
Kant argues that if Leibniz were correct that monads are isolated from
other monads, then they would remain ‘completely immutable’ (1992:
37; NE 1: 410). Even if the substance were in connection with another
substance, ‘if this relation did not change’ there would be no motion or
succession ‘even in the inner states of substances’, and so therefore ‘time
would likewise disappear’ (1992: 37; NE 1: 410). Kant is dismissive of
the ‘sterile’ attempts of the ‘Wolffian philosophy’ to account for change
within substances, by positing an ‘inner principle of activity’ through
which ‘a simple substance’ is ‘subject to constant change’ (1992: 38;
NE 1: 411). For a change to occur, Kant argues, ‘a determination’ must
‘come into being which was not previously present’ (1992: 37; NE 1:
411), but as the essence of a substance is necessary and immutable, it is
hard to see where this change in determination could come from.
It is at this point that the divine mind plays a crucial role, with Kant
arguing that the required external connection arises ‘in virtue of the
connection’ by means of which the substances ‘are linked together in
the idea entertained by the Infinite Being’ (1992: 34; NE 1: 415).
Because of this connection in the divine mind there is ‘a universal
harmony of things’, which avoids being a Leibnizian pre-established
harmony in that what the divine mind sustains is ‘a real reciprocal
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
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action between substances’, such that there is an ‘interaction between
substances by means of truly efficient causes’ (1992: 44; NE 1: 415).
Kant is confident that the connecting role of the divine mind distances
his system of ‘truly efficient causes’ from Knutzen’s ‘threadbare system
of efficient causes’, where ‘the principle of substances, considered as
existing in isolation’ is regarded by Knutzen as sufficient to ground
connection, when in fact the ‘origin itself of the reciprocal connection
of things y is to be sought outside the principle of substances’, in
God alone (1992: 44–5; NE 1: 416). At the same time, God does not
need constantly to intervene by a ‘special influence’ along the lines of
‘Malebranche’s occasional causes y now one way, now another,
according to circumstances’. This is unnecessary in Kant’s system
because ‘the same indivisible act, which brings substances into existence
and sustains them in existence, procures their reciprocal and universal
dependence’ (1992: 44; NE 1: 415).
In the second of the principles set out in the New Elucidation,
the ‘principle of coexistence’, Kant also reflects on the role of the
divine mind. This principle is made up of two claims. First of all, ‘finite
substances, do not, in virtue of their existence alone, stand in rela-
tionship with each other’; and secondly, the ‘divine understanding’ as
the ‘common principle of their existence’ is required to maintain the
substances ‘in a state of harmony in their reciprocal relations’ (1992:
40; NE 1: 413).
The ‘principle of coexistence’ effectively targets Crusius’s claim that the
mere existence of a substance is sufficient to connect it with other
substances. Crusius tells us that through the ‘mere existence’ of sub-
stances ‘the existence, or a certain manner of existing, of another thing
is made possible, impossible, or necessary’ (Crusius 2009: y79, 156–7).
Even though Crusius is careful to add that such an ‘existential ground’
is in itself ‘inefficacious’, with the need for a further ‘active power’ to
produce an effect, it is nonetheless the case that the existential ground
alone establishes a common world, and also that the ‘active power’
arises from the ‘inner property of its essencey due to which something
else is actual or comes to be’, without the need for God to establish
connections over and above the act of creating the substances. Reading
the ‘principle of coexistence’ in the context of Crusius helps us to
appreciate the ontological force of Kant’s claim here: he is not just
commenting on a Leibnizian reduction of relational properties to non-
relational intrinsic properties,5 but is insisting on a substantive ontological
dependence of relational properties upon the divine mind.
christopher insole
404 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 16 – 3
When discussing the nature of space in his 1756 work Physical
Monadology, Kant is able to apply the distinction drawn both in Living
Forces and the New Elucidation between the mere existence of a sub-
stance and the forces that arise from the divinely willed connection
between substances. Already in ‘Living Forces’, Kant reflects that ‘it is
easy to prove that’:
there would be no space and no extension, if substances had no
force which has an effect external to themselves. For without
this force, there is no connection, and without this there is no
order, and finally, without this, there is no space. (LF 1: 23)
In the Physical Monadology Kant argues that monads are spatially
extended, inasmuch as they have a sphere of activity in relation to other
monads: space is the appearance of this connectivity between monads.
In this way, Kant hopes to reconcile a metaphysical commitment to
simple and indivisible substances with the infinite geometrical divisibility
of space: if space is derivative from the relations between substances, it
can be divisible, without the fundamental substances from which it is
derivative also needing to be divisible.
Alison Laywine (1993: 48–9) helpfully draws attention to the parallel
between the New Elucidation and the Physical Monadology. In the
New Elucidation, Kant tells us that the mere existence of substances is
not sufficient to put them in relation; it is only because these substances
are put into community by the mind of God that they are in relation,
and that a world, time, and succession are possible. Similarly, in the
Physical Monadology Kant reflects on how space, and the volume and
extension of bodies are derivative from the connection of substances,
which are themselves not infinitely divisible or extended. As Laywine
puts it, so long as Kant is entitled to ‘distinguish between the core of an
element’s inner determinations and the sphere of its activity’, which
according to the principle of coexistence he is, then he is entitled to say
‘that an element has volume by reason of the latter and the status of a
true, simple substance by reason of the former’ (1993: 49).
Kant gives God a two-fold role in the Physical Monadology. First of all,
and most importantly, God is the source of the connectivity between
substances, from which space is derivative6 as the appearance of
external relations. Secondly, God’s relation to the creation provides
Kant with an analogy of how something can give rise to spatial phe-
nomena, without being itself spatial, as God can be ‘internally present
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
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to all created things by the act of preservation’, without us fearing that
in dividing things in space – the ‘orbit of His presence’- we therefore
‘divide God’ (1992: 58; PM 1: 481).
2. Voluntarist and Intellectualist Construals of the Role
of the Divine Mind
At the outset I acknowledged that commentators such as Laywine,
Scho¨nfeld, Langton, and Watkins all correctly identify the importance
of God in connecting substances, as set out above. What is less clear in
the literature is the precise role of the divine understanding in relation
to the divine will in this creative and connecting process. In this section,
I outline the distinction between the divine will and understanding as it
came to Kant through the German rationalist tradition. At this point, I
will clarify my use of key terms, certainly not exhaustively, but sufficiently
for our purposes in the following discussion. I will discuss the following in
turn: relational and dispositional properties, in the context of the dis-
tinction between intrinsic/extrinsic properties; substances, natures, and
essences; essentialism, and intellectualism/voluntarism. Langton’s volun-
tarist and anti-essentialist interpretation of the pre-Critical Kant will be
set out, and located in a wider voluntarist theological genealogy, with a
suggestion towards the end of the section as to the source of Langton’s
misreading of Kant.
Through the rationalist theological tradition coming through Leibniz,
Wolff, and Baumgarten, Kant inherits the traditional theological dis-
tinction between the divine ‘properties of understanding and will’,
which belong ‘to the necessary being’, because ‘understanding and will
are, both of them, true realities, and they can both co-exist together
with the greatest possible reality in one thing’, such that ‘understanding
and will, and all reality of the nature of mind, would have to be possible
in others through the necessary being as a ground’ (1992: 132; OPA 2:
88). Echoing the scholastic Christianized Platonism that remained in
rationalist theology, Kant writes of the divine understanding as containing
the ‘real ground’, ‘the possibility of all other things, in respect of what is
real in them’ (1992: 131; OPA 2: 86), such that ‘all other reality [is] given
through the necessary being as its ground’ (1992: 131; OPA 2: 87).
The idea, also found in Leibniz (1989: 151), Baumgarten (1926: yy863–5,
168), and Wolff (2009: y989, 51), is that instantiated created reality is a
metaphysically possible restriction and combination of all the possibi-
lities contained in the divine mind, such that ‘all reality is, in one way or
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another, embraced by the ultimate real ground’ (1992: 136; OPA 2: 92).
The ‘essences of things’ (1992: 136; OPA 2: 92) are grounded in the ‘data
of all possibility y found in the necessary being’ (1992: 129; OPA 2:
85), with the essence of each created substance representing a particular
set of possibilities, obtained by the restriction and combination of the
total set of possibilities in the divine understanding. For any particular
substance, the subset of total possibilities constitutes the ‘nature’ or the
‘essence’ of the substance: this ‘essence’ constitutes the set of properties
that the substance must have in order to be that substance.
This conception of God as the ens realissimum survives as a regulative
idea in Kant’s first Critique (1998: 553–9; CPR A572/B600–A583/B611),
where Kant explains the regulative use of the idea that ‘the thorough-
going determination of every thing rests on the limitation of this All of
reality’ (1998: 556–7; CPR A577/B605), where ‘all possible predicates of
things’ are contained in the ‘storehouse’ of the divine mind (1998: 555;
CPR A575/B603). The ‘particular possibility of every thing’ (1998: 554;
CPR A573/B601) is obtained through a process of limitation, whereby
with ‘every given pair of opposed predicates’, one ‘must always apply’
and the other be denied, so that the ‘determination of a thing is sub-
ordinated to the allness or the sum total of all possible predicates’ (1998:
555; CPR A575/B603).
In order to relate this rationalist position to wider interpretative and
philosophical issues, it is helpful to say something here about the dis-
tinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Roughly speaking, a
property of a substance is extrinsic if it depends upon the existence of
another created substance. It is an intrinsic property if it belongs to the
substance independently of the existence of other created substances.
We need to add the qualifier ‘created’ here to make the distinction work
against a theistic framework, as even intrinsic properties will be
dependent upon the existence of God.
There is a vast literature that attempts to give a more finely grained and
precise account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.7 It is not necessary
for our purposes to enter into an intricate discussion of this, for three
reasons. First of all, as I will show below, the distinction drawn in the
paragraph above is sufficient for our purpose of setting out Kant’s
intellectualism and essentialism. Secondly, as it is unlikely that Kant has
anything much more precise in mind, any further elaboration will be a
reconstruction and an extrapolation. Thirdly, the contemporary debate
about the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction arguably does not map all that
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
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well onto Kant, in that it tends to test intrinsicality by asking, through an
extensional logic, whether ascription of a property extends over all or
only some possible worlds in which the substance exists. Kant is more
interested in tracking the subset of intrinsic properties of substances that
are structurally fundamental and explanatory of substances, rather than
all the properties that extend over ‘possible worlds/sets’ (see section 3).
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction relates to talk about the ‘essence’ or
‘nature’ (these can be used interchangeably for our purposes) of a sub-
stance in the following way. Where the ‘essence’ of a substance represents
those properties the substance must have in order to be that substance,
we can ask whether the essence of a substance contains only intrinsic
properties, or intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Given the rough distinc-
tion drawn above, this amounts to asking whether the substance can be
the substance it is, if it exists without being in connection with any other
substances. In the discussion in section 1, it became clear, particularly in
Living Forces and the ‘principle of coexistence’, that Kant does indeed
consider that a substance can exist without being in connection with any
other substances. This means that, for Kant, none of the essential properties
of a substance – those it must have to be what it is – are extrinsic.
All essential properties of a substance, for Kant, are intrinsic properties.
When in formulations below I talk of ‘essential (and therefore intrinsic)
properties’, it is to this substantive commitment of Kant’s that I refer.
I note here that although all essential properties are intrinsic, it does not
follow that all intrinsic properties are essential. There might be intrinsic
properties that are not essential to the substance. For example, that
Socrates is five feet tall would look like an intrinsic property, but not an
essential property, in the way that ‘being rational’ might be considered
to be. The contemporary debate tends to draw the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction in the noted logical and extensional way by asking of any
property whether it extends over the set of a substance’s properties
irrespective of the existence of other substances. For this reason, the
literature about the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is beset with proble-
matic properties that seem to generate troubling results: for example,
the property of ‘being accompanied by the number 21’ (Francescotti
1999: 596), if we suppose numbers to exist and to be necessary beings;
and disjunctive properties such as the property of ‘being square-and-
accompanied’ or ‘being circular-and-unaccompanied’ (Vallentyne 1997:
210–11). As these ‘properties’ gravitate towards the set of properties
that the object has irrespective of the existence or absence of other
objects, they tend to count as ‘intrinsic’ to the object. Meanwhile, our
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‘intuitions’ about intrinsic properties – about what it is we are trying to
track here – continue to tell us that these properties should not count as
intrinsic. The literature then divides into those who think that the
problem is with our intuitions, such that we should be prepared to
count ‘being accompanied by the number 21’ as intrinsic (Vallentyne
1997: 209–19; Langton and Lewis 1998: 333–45), and those who try to
repair the membership criteria of the sets, to exclude such properties
(Francescotti 1999: 560–609).
One line of attack, in the light of these difficulties, would be to deny the
value of an extensional approach to intrinsic properties when dealing
with historical thinkers such as Leibniz and Kant (see Cover and
O’Leary-Hawthorne 1999: 19–26). This could be joined up in interesting
ways with the argument made by Ellis (2001: 26–32) that a causal and
explanatory way of discerning intrinsic properties is also more illumi-
nating when considering the practice of contemporary science. Although
it might seem plausible that Kant is more interested in those intrinsic
properties that are structurally and causally explanatory for substances,
it is not necessary for us to adjudicate on this issue; the interpretative
dividing line that concerns us arises when we ask whether any of the
subset of intrinsic properties that are essential to the substance are dis-
positional, whether intrinsic properties are construed extensionally or
causally. By a ‘dispositional’ property I mean a property such that the
substance would have determinate relational properties in the event that
the substance were placed in connection with other substances. The point
needs to be put in this subjunctive way – relational properties the sub-
stance would have were it placed in connection – because we already
know that none of the essential (and therefore intrinsic) properties of a
substance are actually relational, because, for Kant, substances can exist
in isolation from other substances.
I will defend the claim that Kant has an ‘essentialist’ position about
relational properties. What I mean by ‘essentialism about relational
properties’ is precisely the following: Kant is ‘essentialist’ in that he
considers that some of the properties the substance needs to have to be
that substance (its essential and therefore intrinsic properties) are
indeed dispositional, determining, or partly determining, some of the
relational properties that the substance would have if it were placed in
connection with other substances. In the remainder of the article I will
just refer to ‘essentialism’, but it should be understood that I intend the
precise sense set out here. It is important to qualify the essentialist claim,
as I have done, so that it reads ‘determining, or partly determining, some
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
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of the relational properties’. There will be some relational properties of a
substance that are jointly determined by the intrinsic essential properties
of more than one substance, or that are determined by intrinsic but not
essential properties (for example, ‘Simmias is taller than Socrates’).
Depending on how broadly we construe relational properties, there
might also be relational properties that have very little to do with the
substance itself, such as ‘being such that the Second World War is over’,
or ‘being accompanied by the number 21’, if numbers exist and are
necessary beings.
These qualifications need not concern us in any detail, just because the
voluntarist construal of Kant, represented here by Langton, amounts to
the claim that for Kant the essential (and therefore intrinsic) properties
of the substance, those properties the substance has when considered in
isolation from the superadded connection with other substances, do not
include any dispositional properties that determine how the substance
would relate to other substances if placed in connection with them
(although the substance could still have uninteresting logical intrinsic
‘relational’ properties such as ‘being identical with itself’). For the
voluntarist relational properties that determine how the substance
relates to other substances are added by the divine will, when the
substance is placed in relation with other substances: hence they are
extrinsic. Furthermore, and herein lies the contingency of the laws of
nature, the divine will can choose which relational properties will be
paired with which essential intrinsic properties, such that there are no
immanent patterns of entailment from any set of intrinsic properties to
any determinate relational properties.
We are now in a position to offer a precise account of what we mean here
by ‘intellectualism’ and ‘voluntarism’. One has an intellectualist position
if, and only if, God’s will is constrained by the structure of the divine
understanding, which is itself constrained by an essentialist metaphysics
(in the sense defined above), which conceives of some of the relational
properties of substances being constrained by the intrinsic dispositions of
substances. We have a ‘voluntarist’ construal of God if, and only if,
God’s will is unconstrained even by a ‘divine understanding’, such that
none of the relational properties of substances (in connection with other
substances) are constrained by the intrinsic properties of substances. God
has the power to superadd to intrinsic properties whatever relational
properties God wishes. Just as the intellectualist conception of God
involves an essentialism about relational properties, the voluntarist
conception commits us to a view of relational properties as contingent.
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The history of Christian theology, according to a standard narrative at
least,8 reflects these two fundamental philosophical patterns for con-
ceiving the relationship between the creator and the creation. Particular
theologians become associated with each of these positions. As what
matter to us here are the positions as set out in the standard narrative, I
will report these traditional characterizations of theologians, without
thereby endorsing them as accurate or fair interpretations of the historical
thinkers.
On the intellectualist model, represented by aspects of a thinker such as
Aquinas, informed by Platonic and Aristotelian thought, there are
immanent patterns of structured order within the essences of things,
such that even the divine will is constrained by these patterns of order,
which are themselves part of the divine nature (the divine under-
standing). Here we have something like a Christianized account of
Platonic forms, located in the divine mind. In reaction to this, theologians
such as Duns Scotus and Ockham are concerned that such patterns of
order constrain the sovereign freedom of God. Meditating on the free-
dom of God suggests, for such thinkers, that there can be no necessary
immanent connections in nature: God wills the nature of the connection
between created substances, and can change his will at any time. To
know the will of God, we need to discover the structure of things as
chosen and willed by God, placing an emphasis on both revelation and
empirical observation, over and above a priori reasoning, which attends
to the structure of our concepts and thought.
Langton represents particularly clearly a tendency to read the role of
the divine mind in Kant along voluntarist lines. It is not hard to see the
temptation of such a line of thought. Kant tells us that substances can
(conceptually speaking) enjoy an independent existence without any
relations to other substances, such that it requires the will of God to
connect substances so that they enjoy relations amongst one another.
Relations between substances arise because of the ‘arbitrary will’ of
God, which can be ‘omitted or not omitted at his pleasure’ (2004: 121).
Langton understands this as suggestive of a looseness of fit between the
properties the substance has intrinsically and those that it has in rela-
tion to other substances: because God could in principle create the very
same substance but superadd different relational/causal properties.
Langton considers that Kant shares with recent philosophers a widely
held commitment to the contingency of the causal and relational
properties of substances and the laws of nature that govern/describe
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these causal and relational properties (2004: 121). On Langton’s
interpretation ‘Kant’s intuition’ is that ‘things could be just as they are
with respect to their intrinsic properties, yet different with respect to
their causal powers’, because of the ‘contingency of the connections – if
any – between intrinsic properties and causal powers’ (2004: 118). So,
for example, ‘in a world where the laws of nature were different, things
might not have an attractive power, despite having the very same
intrinsic properties that attractive things actually have’ (2004: 118).
Langton insightfully draws the links between such a conception of the
contingency of the laws of nature and a doctrine about the freedom of
God ‘to add or not to add any powers he pleases’, such that God’s
creative act is ‘unconstrained and arbitrary’, with ‘this talk of the
arbitrariness of God’s actions’ being a ‘way of talking about the con-
tingency of laws of nature, and hence of the contingency of causal
powers’ (2004: 119).
Philosophically and historically Langton is correct about the conceptual
momentum that runs from a voluntarist doctrine of God to the con-
tingency of laws of nature. The problem with Langton’s approach is not
so much with the way in which the conceptual possibilities are carved
out, but with where Kant is placed on the map. As I will argue in the
next section, the problem with this reading is that it misunderstands
what Kant actually says about the restricted role of the divine will:
although the divine will does play a vital role in ‘switching on’ relations
between substances, Kant is otherwise intellectualist and essentialist
about the nature of relations. Langton is correct to observe that sub-
stances need an ‘arbitrary act of God’ (2004: 121), but wrong to assert
that therefore they do not supervene, in a strong sense, upon the
intrinsic properties of substances.
Where I talk above of a ‘strong’ sense in which actual relational
properties supervene on intrinsic properties,9 I mean that there is no
possible world where the divine will could create these substances (with
their essential intrinsic properties) and decide to connect these sub-
stances, and where certain actual relational properties do not constitute
this interconnection between substances. Talking of ‘possible worlds’ in
a context of philosophical theology makes the phraseology unusually
literal. There is a possible world where God creates substances, but
decides not to connect these substances: in which case actual relational
properties do not follow. Passages where Kant defends the position that
God needs to will substances into connection in a conceptual moment
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over and above creating them can be mistaken for a voluntarist denial
of strong supervenience between intrinsic and relational properties.
We find Langton making exactly this mistake when she dismisses
the possibility that Kant allows ‘powers’ or ‘dispositions’ to belong to
the intrinsic properties of substances (2004: 117). Langton argues that
this cannot be what Kant means, given that ‘if the power’ is ‘itself
intrinsic’, then ‘of course it is reducible to intrinsic properties’, which
would mean – Langton wrongly thinks – that there would be ‘no need
whatsoever for God to engage in any creative acts over and above the
creation of substances with their intrinsic properties’, which would
indeed be, as Langton says, ‘thoroughly at odds with what Kant wants
to say’ (2004: 117). What this misses is that God could create sub-
stances with potential intrinsic dispositions, which would require the
further creative act of putting the substances in connection with one
another, in order to turn the dispositional intrinsic properties into
actual relational properties.
3. An Intellectualist Interpretation of the Role of the Divine Mind
Indications of Kant’s intellectualism can be found in the New
Elucidation (1755), with more extensive evidence from his Universal
Natural History (1755). In this section I offer an interpretation of
relevant passages from these texts, before moving onto the Only Possible
Argument of 1763, which clears up any remaining ambiguity, firmly
establishing that the early Kant is intellectualist about God and essentialist
about relational properties.
In relation to the distinction between the divine will and understanding
set out above, it is notable that in the New Elucidation (1755) Kant
locates the ‘common principle’ of the existence and connection of
substances in the ‘divine understanding (divino intellectu)’ (1992: 40;
NE 1: 413). It is ‘the scheme of divine understanding (intellectus divini
schema)’ which establishes ‘the relations of things to each other’, such
that ‘it is most clearly apparent from this that the universal interaction
of all things is to be ascribed to the concept alone of this divine idea
(divinae ideae)’ (1992: 41; NE 1: 413). Although the divine will is given
a role, in that whether or not there are relations between substances is
a matter that can ‘be admitted or omitted in accordance with His
pleasure’, the ‘reciprocal connection of substances’ once activated is
located in the ‘divine intellect (intellectus divini)’ (1992: 42; NE 1:
414). Whenever Kant discusses the reciprocal connection of substances
intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind
VOLUME 16 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW | 413
in this work, he refers to the divine understanding, intellect or ‘the idea
entertained by the Infinite Being’ (1992: 44; NE 1: 415).
In the Universal Natural History (1755), Kant is concerned with the
way in which naturalist thinkers and religious believers can seem to be
in conflict, describing the task of the work to involve reconciling ‘the
order of nature according to mechanism’ and ‘the immediate hand of
the supreme being’ (1969: 17; UNH 1: 221). Kant comments on the
‘proofs’ for the existence of God ‘drawn from the beauty and perfect
arrangement of the universe’ that, although they constitute ‘irrefutable
reasons’, they are used in a ‘bad way’ by the ‘defenders of religion’,
who present a ‘weak side to their position’ (1969: 19; UNH 1: 222).
The problem with the proofs is that although, on the one hand, they
‘elevate’ nature by reflecting on ‘harmonies’, ‘beauty’, and the perfect
relation of ‘means’ to the ‘end of things’, on the other hand, such proofs
‘belittle’ nature (1969: 19; UNH 1: 223). They do this by claiming that
the ‘admirable adaptation’ we see in the world is ‘foreign to nature’ left
to its own resources, and that nature ‘abandoned to its own general
laws y would bring forth nothing but disorder’ (1969: 19; UNH 1:
223). The defenders of religion tend to invoke the ‘wise plan’ of a being
who is ‘alien’ to ‘a matter that is wanting in all order or regularity’
(1969: 19; UNH 1: 223).
Kant sees two problems with such an approach. First of all, in an
intriguing anticipation of Kant’s critique of the physico-theological
proof for the existence of God in the first Critique (1998: 578–88;
CPR A620/B648–A630/B658), Kant complains that it implies a picture
where ‘matter and its general laws’ are in some sense ‘independent’ of
the ‘Supremely Wise Power’, who then needs to impose providential
purposes upon an unformed and chaotic nature, which would imply
a being who is ‘indeed great, but not infinite’, ‘powerful, but not
all-sufficient’ (1969: 20; UNH, 1: 223). As Kant puts it in the first
Critique, we end up with the ‘highest architect of the world’, limited by
‘the suitability of the material on which he works’ (1998: 581; CPR
A627/B655).
Secondly, Kant is convinced that belittling nature and bringing in an
interventionist God does not do justice to the necessary patterns of order
and harmony that are contained within nature. Kant agrees with the
naturalist that the ‘useful arrangements’ of nature can in fact ‘be derived
from the most general and simple laws of nature’, such ‘that matter,
while determining itself by the mechanism of its own forces, possesses a
christopher insole
414 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 16 – 3
certain rightness in its effects and y satisfies without compulsion the
rules of harmony’ (1969: 22; UNH 1: 224–5). Kant sees ‘a beautiful and
orderly whole quite naturally developing itself’, not ‘by accident, or of
chance’, but by the ‘natural qualities’ that ‘necessarily bring it about’
(1969: 25–6; UNH 1: 227). Putting strain on the interpretation of Kant
offered by Langton, where a voluntarist God oversees contingent laws of
nature, Kant tells us that ‘matter’, by which he means the ‘primitive
constituent of all things’, is ‘bound to certain necessary laws’, such that
‘when it is freely abandoned to these laws it must necessarily bring forth
beautiful combinations. It has no freedom to deviate from this perfect
plan’ (1969: 25–6; UNH 1: 227–8). Again, later on in the same text, ‘the
elements have essential forces with which to put each other in motion,
and thus are themselves a source of life. Matter immediately begins to
strive to fashion itself ‘ (1969: 75; UNH 1: 264).
The defender of religion is concerned that ‘those harmonies which may
be explained from a natural tendency of matter, may prove nature to be
independent of Divine providence’ (1969: 20; UNH 1: 223). It is at this
point that Kant’s emphasis on the divine understanding comes into play.
The harmonies that necessarily exist in nature have their source in the
divine understanding, rather than in the divine will: for this reason,
God does not need to bring about the harmonies in nature through
a ‘special government’ (1969: 22; UNH 1: 224). The harmony and
lawfulness of the nature can only be supported by being itself grounded
in the divine understanding:
How would it be at all possible that things of such diverse
nature should tend in combination with each other to effectuate
harmonies and beauties so admirably, and even to subserve the
ends of such things as are found in some respects outside of the
sphere of dead matter (as in being useful to men and animals),
unless they acknowledged a common origin, namely, an Infinite
Intelligence, an Understanding (Verstand) in which the essential
properties of all things have been relatively designed? (1969: 23;
UNH 1: 225)
As the ‘general and simple laws of nature’ have their source in the
divine understanding, the believer has nothing to fear from heaping up
‘examples which prove that the general laws of nature are fruitful in
perfectly beautiful consequences’ (1969: 20; UNH 1: 223). We have
what we might call a ‘supported essentialism’ at work. Nature unfolds
according to ‘its inherent essential striving’ which ‘brings y a result
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necessarily with it’, with this essential striving itself constituting ‘the
most splendid evidence of its dependence on that pre-existing Being
who contains in Himself not only the source of these beings themselves
but their primary laws of action’ (1969: 23–4; UNH 1: 226).
That which seems to be a consideration against the need for God, the
orderliness of nature without divine interventions, becomes for Kant a
consideration in favour of the need for God, as the source of the general
order in nature: ‘reasons which, as used in the hands of opponents, are
dreaded as prejudicial, are rather in themselves powerful weapons by
which to combat them’ (1969: 22; UNH 1: 225). Kant’s position is a
subtle one: in order for nature to be such that it does not require the
constant intervention of a divine will, there needs to be a divine under-
standing, supporting, and sustaining the structure of the laws of nature.
In terms of the voluntarism/intellectualism distinction used above,
Kant considers that an intellectualist conception of God is required to
explain the order of nature. The defenders of religion adopt a volun-
tarist conception when they ‘belittle’ nature, and then invoke an
interventionist God to create order out of chaos. That a ‘beautiful and
orderly whole’ is ‘necessarily’ brought about by ‘natural qualities’ is an
‘undeniable proof of the community of their origin at first, which must
have been a universal Supreme Intelligence (Verstand)’ (1969: 25–6;
UNH 1: 227), with the ‘essential character’ of the ‘elements’ of nature
‘being a consequence of the eternal idea of the Divine Intelligence
(go¨ttlichen Verstandes)’ (1969: 74; UNH 1: 263). Proofs for the exis-
tence of God do not depend upon a wilful designer, imposing order
where we would expect chaos, but upon a structure of design as such,
which is not external to God, because it is part of what is meant by
Kant’s intellectualist conception of God. We can now understand Kant’s
precise meaning when he complains that proofs for the existence of
God, although irrefutable, can be used in a ‘bad way’ (1969: 19; UNH
1: 222): they are used in a bad way when they lead us to the divine will,
rather than to the divine understanding.
Someone keen to defend the voluntarism-contingency model, over the
intellectualism-essentialism account, is not entirely without possible
resources even at this point. The essentialism I ascribe to Kant is a
precise metaphysical commitment, and not simply a tendency to use the
language of essences, which could be done by non-essentialist thinkers.
It could be suggested that the passages from the Universal History are
compatible with the following picture: God creates isolated substances,
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and in a separate conceptual moment determines – for this world –
what the properties of these substances will be. These properties are
fixed by the divine will, and insofar as they are indeed fixed, could be
called ‘essential’ properties of the fundamental constituents of nature.
According to this account, the apparent ‘essentialism’ at work in
Kant derives from a conceptually prior act of divine fiat, which decides
the contents of the divine understanding. At a more ultimate level,
God voluntaristically determines what the ‘essential’ properties of
substances (in this world) are going to be; but it would have been
possible – there is a possible world – where God could have created the
same substances but with different ‘essential’ properties, such that
matter would ‘necessarily’ (in that world) have always and everywhere
‘strived essentially’ in a different way.
I do not think that this would be a plausible or natural reading of the
texts presented above, but the determined advocate of the voluntarism-
contingency interpretation could hold out for this as a possible recon-
struction. What such a sceptic would need to see, to be convinced of the
intellectualist and essentialist interpretation, would be an explicit
statement from Kant that the divine will does not and cannot change or
determine the content of the divine understanding, because the divine
will is indeed constrained, in any possible world, such that where a
certain substance is brought into existence, and put into connection,
God has no choice but to create that substance with determinate causal
and relational properties. It is in the The Only Possible Argument
(1763) where Kant does indeed state precisely this, definitively settling
the interpretative issue in favour of intellectualism about God and
essentialism about relational properties.10
In the Only Possible Argument Kant speaks a great deal about the
‘essences of things’ (1992: 137; OPA 2: 93), which he explains are
necessary and binding, even on the will of God. When we encounter
order and harmony, it would be ‘quite alien to the nature of the things
themselves’ to say that they ‘stand in this harmonious relation’ because ‘a
Creator has ordered them this way’ (1992: 140; OPA 2: 96). God does
not make the ‘claws of a cat’ retractable ‘with a view to protecting them
from wear’ (1992: 140; OPA 2: 96). Kant considers that positing this sort
of design invites Voltaire’s satirical comment that God has given us noses
‘so that we can wear spectacles’ (1992: 172; OPA 2: 131). Rather, we
should say that the ‘simple law was the source of further usefulness and
harmoniousness, not by art, but rather by necessity’, and that there
inheres ‘in the very essence of things themselves universal relations to
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unity and cohesiveness’, such that ‘a universal harmony would extend
throughout the realm of possibility itself’ (1992: 140; OPA 2: 96).
Although God decides upon ‘the existence of things’, he does not decide
their internal possibilities; rather the ‘internal possibility of things,
namely, furnishes Him y with the material’ for the creation (1992:
144; OPA 2: 100). The ‘essences of these materials’ contain within
themselves ‘an extraordinary adaptedness to harmony’ (1992: 144;
OPA 2: 100). Kant is explicit that this ‘adaptedness and harmony’
should ‘not be attributed to a free choice’ (1992: 144; OPA 2: 101) of
God, because the harmony ‘is inherent in the very possibility of the
things in question’, so that ‘the element of contingency, presupposed by
any [divine] choice, here disappears’ (1992: 146; OPA 2: 103). The
‘union of numerous diverse consequences’ that we find in the world is
‘not a contingent union’, and so not a ‘product of a free will’ (1992:
144; OPA 2: 101). Kant even says that it would be ‘absurd’ to attribute
the ‘great harmony’ of ‘beautiful relations’ to ‘a will’ (1992: 144–5;
OPA 2: 101). There is no legitimacy in an appeal to the ‘divine power of
choice’, when the ‘essences’ of things ‘contain within themselves an
agreement which is extensive and necessary’ (1992: 171; OPA 2: 131).
Kant illustrates this with concrete examples drawn from the harmony
and lawfulness that constitute the earth’s atmosphere, ‘the possibilities
of the pump, respiration, the conversion of liquidsy into vapours, the
winds, and so on’ (1992: 144; OPA 2: 101). For example, ‘the char-
acteristic of air, in virtue of which it offers resistance to the material
bodies moving in it’ is to be ‘regarded as a necessary consequence of its
nature’ (1992: 145; OPA 2: 102). It is ‘inherent in the essence of the
thing itself’ that ‘a celestial body in its liquid state should, entirely
necessarily y strive to assume a spherical form’, which ‘harmonises
with the other purposes of the universe better than any other possible
form’ (1992: 145; OPA 2: 102).
The role of God in the Only Possible Argument is consistent with the
earlier texts discussed above. The existence ‘of all this harmoniousness
along with its consequences’ continues to be ‘attributed to the power of
choice of the first cause’ (1992: 145; OPA 2: 101), to the ‘wise choice of
Him who created them on account of that harmony’ (1992: 146; OPA 2:
103). Furthermore, and again consistent with the earlier texts, it would
be false to say that the harmonious connection of the essences does not
depend upon God. Although they do not depend on the divine will, they
do depend entirely on the divine understanding. It is not Kant’s intention
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to restrict the extent of the dependence of the creation on the divine
mind, as if the essences of things are somehow independent of God.
Rather, Kant seeks to differentiate two types of total dependence on God,
which Kant names ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’ dependency. We have a
‘moral’ dependency when ‘God is the ground of that thing through his
will’, and a ‘non-moral’ dependency in the case of the ‘internal possibility
of things’, of which the divine understanding is the ‘ultimate ground’
(1992: 143–4; OPA 2: 100).
It is this distinction between moral and non-moral dependency on
God that lies behind Kant’s discussion in the Only Possible Argument
of the distinction between ‘existence’ and the properties that constitute
an essence. This anticipates Kant’s Critical refutation of the ontological
argument (1998: 563–9; CPR A592/B620–A602/B630), which revolves
around the observation that ‘existence’ is ‘not a real predicate’ (1998:
567; CPR A598/B626). Kant opens the Only Possible Argument by
observing that when God utters ‘His almighty Let there be over a
possible world’ by bringing it into existence he ‘he adds no new predicate
to it’, but ‘posits it with all its predicates’ (1992: 120; OPA 2: 74). This
understanding of existence, as not adding any new predicates, is related
to Kant’s essentialist and intellectualist position that ‘all determinations
and predicates of the real thing are also to be found in the mere possibility
of that same thing’ (1992: 120; OPA 2: 75).
4. Wider Implications for the Interpretation of Kant
The interpretation of Kant that I present here places him in consider-
able agreement with Leibniz and Wolff on the two issues of intellec-
tualism about the divine mind and essentialism about nature.11
Scho¨nfeld (2000: 206) draws attention to the way in which for Leibniz
essences ‘exist in a certain realm of ideas y in God himself’ as the
‘reason for things must be sought in metaphysical necessities or in
eternal truths’ (Leibniz 1989: 151), with God’s creative act restricted to
choosing from the essences contained in the divine understanding:
Sincey God’s decree consists solely in the resolution he forms,
after having compared all possible worlds, to choose that one
which is best, and bring it into existence with all that this world
contains, by means of the all-powerful word Fiat, it is plain to
see that this decree changes nothing in the constitution of things:
God leaves them just as they were in the state of mere possibility,
that is, changing nothing either in their essence or nature or even
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in their accidents, which are represented perfectly already in the
idea of this possible world. (Leibniz 1985: vol. 1, pp. 52, 151)
Similarly Wolff restricts the extent to which one can ‘appeal to the will
of God’, observing that as the ‘divine understanding is the source of
essence, or of what is possible’, and the divine will ‘the source of
actuality’, one cannot ‘appeal to the will of God when asking about
how something is possible, but rather only when one desires to know
why something is actual’ (Wolff 2009: y989, 51).
This is of more than antiquarian interest. There has recently been a
significant and growing minority report against the Humean orthodoxy
about the contingency of laws of nature.12 For example, Ellis argues
that the actual practice of science requires some form of ‘essentialism’
about the identity of substances, properties, or events, such that the
‘laws of nature are what they are, because things of various kinds have
the dispositional properties that they have essentially’ (2001: 1). In line
with our discussion above, Ellis construes essential properties of a
substance as properties ‘in virtue of which an object/process is the kind
of thing it is’ (2001: 21). One of the central issues for Ellis, and also for
Mumford (2004: 149–53, 183–6) and Bird (2001: 267–74), is a concern
about the ‘quidditism’ implied by the Humean picture: the notion that a
substance (property or process) can somehow be the same substance
(property or process) across different worlds, even if all of its causal
relations are entirely different.13 The Humean picture allows this
because dispositional and relational properties are not considered to be
part of the identity of substances.
From our discussion of Kant above it should be clear that he would
agree with this concern about quidditism, and that he would be
essentialist in thinking that the identity of substances is necessarily
bound up with (potential) relational properties of the substance, which
constitute the essence of that substance. When Kant is mentioned in
the new essentialist literature, as he is occasionally, he is listed as one
of the ancestors of the Humean contemporary orthodoxy about the
contingency of the laws of nature, along with Descartes and Newton
(Mumford, 2004: 13, 69, 185; Ellis 2001: 1, 263).14 With regard to his
early philosophy at least, this is incorrect.
The role of God in the contingent conception of laws of nature has not
gone unnoticed in the new essentialist literature. Mumford argues that
talking about ‘laws of nature’ as the source of regularities in nature only
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makes sense against a theistic backdrop, where there is a being who can
issue and impose such commands, so that ‘only theists’ need to take such
‘law-talk seriously’ (2006: 201). Ellis comments that when in the early
modern period the laws of nature are no longer considered to be immanent
in the structure of things, God is then invoked as the source of these laws
(2001: 261–3). The ‘contemporary orthodoxy’, according to this analysis,
is what happens when God is abandoned, but the voluntaristic conception
of laws operating on an inert world anachronistically remains.
Appreciating the vital role played by God in Kant’s thought helps to open
up a different historical and conceptual texture: for Leibniz, Wolff, and
Kant, God is vital, but not in his commanding voluntaristic capacity.
God, specifically the divine understanding, is crucial as the source of the
structure of reason itself, within which are contained all the possible
combinations of properties that constitute the essences of things found in
the world. A reference to God as sustaining the laws of nature is not
necessarily a commitment to voluntarism about God, or to the contingency
of imposed laws of nature. It would, in principle at least, be possible for
the divine understanding to play a similar explanatory role, albeit suitably
adapted, in supporting a position aligned with the ‘new scientific essenti-
alism’, with the divine mind sustaining the immanent necessary structural
properties of fundamental particles, processes, and events.
As well as placing Kant more plausibly in his intellectual context, this
interpretation of Kant’s pre-Critical philosophy opens up intriguing
possibilities, which will only be briefly touched on here, for how to
interpret aspects of Kant’s later Critical philosophy, specifically his
transcendental idealism, and his notion of freedom.
Our discussion has two implications for how to read Kant’s transcendental
idealism: one more negative and the other more constructive. On the
negative side, pressure is placed on approaches to transcendental idealism
that trace strong lines of continuity between the Critical noumenal/
phenomenal distinction and Kant’s pre-Critical distinction between the
intrinsic and extrinsic properties of substances. Langton’s account is one of
the more developed interpretations along these lines (Langton 2004:
97–123), although other commentators have experimented with similar
views, if only to reject them (Ameriks 2000: 267–77).
Langton, as we have seen, considers that the ‘intrinsic’ properties of
substances, for the early Kant, do not in themselves determine what the
relational properties of substances will be. God has the ability to pair
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up intrinsic and relational properties as God wills, so that relational
properties are irreducible to intrinsic properties. Langton goes on to
argue that there is an epistemic dimension to this that continues to be
relevant in Kant’s Critical work: because any property of a substance
that we know about is by definition a relational property (relating to
our cognition), and because relational properties are only loosely and
contingently fitted to intrinsic properties, we can never know the
intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves. Kant’s transcendental ide-
alism is to be understood as a thesis about our epistemic humility, much
of which is already implicitly in place in Kant’s early philosophy, in
terms of our inability to know the intrinsic properties of substances.
Whether or not a plausible account along these lines can be given of
Kant’s later philosophy, our discussion shows that it does not describe
Kant’s pre-Critical position, which Langton draws on extensively when
justifying her interpretation of Kant’s mature philosophy. Relational
properties are determined by the intrinsic properties of substances, and
Kant seems to indicate that knowledge of the essential intrinsic prop-
erties of substances is therefore possible. He talks in the Only Possible
Argument of our ‘mature judgement’ concerning the ‘essential proper-
ties of things known to us through experience’, which enables us to
‘perceive unity y and harmoniousness’, and to ‘argue regressively to
a single principle of all possibility’, establishing that the ‘essence of
things themselves’ indicates ‘an ultimate common ground’ (1992: 136;
OPA 2: 92). In the Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles
of Natural Theology and Morality (1763), Kant is positive about our
epistemic access to essences. In the context of talking about our
knowledge of a physical world and metaphysics Kant writes that ‘even
if you are not acquainted with the complete essence of the thing, you
can still safely employ those characteristic marks to infer a great deal
from them about the thing in question’ (1992: 259; 2: 286).
On the more positive side, our discussion is suggestive for an inter-
pretation of transcendental idealism, which I develop extensively else-
where (Insole, 2011a, 2011b). At this point I offer only suggestive hints.
In his pre-Critical philosophy, as we saw above in the discussion of the
‘Physical Monadology’, Kant considers that space (and time) are the
external appearances of relational properties that are superadded to
substances by the divine mind. In his Critical philosophy, Kant con-
tinues to think of space and time as features of reality that arise from
mind, except that this mind is now the human noumenal mind, rather
than the divine mind.15 Kant has a number of reasons for making this
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shift, some epistemic and others relating to his concern to make a non-
compatibilist conception of freedom possible for human beings (in as
much as we are regarded as noumenal beings), which Kant begins to
want in the 1770s (prior to which he was content with an exhaustively
compatibilist account of human freedom).16
Having in mind this pre-Critical background enables us to understand
how many features of reality as we experience it can be, for the Critical
Kant, in some sense mind-dependent, yet also given and non-negotiable.
In his early philosophy, the dominance of intellectualism and essenti-
alism ensures that a reliance upon the divine mind does not imply
a constructive or voluntaristic divine mind; similarly in his Critical
philosophy, a reliance on mind (albeit a different sort of mind) does not
imply constructivism or voluntarism, because of the given and non-
negotiable structure of the mind-dependent structures. Furthermore,
and also to be discussed fully elsewhere, properly understanding the
role of the divine mind enables us to construe continuities in Kant’s
conception of freedom, running from his pre-Critical to the Critical
writings. It is tempting to think that God is constrained by the structure
of reason itself; but that would not be quite right for Kant, as the
structure of reason is itself identical to the understanding of God. The
structure of reason constitutes the understanding of God, and equally,
the understanding of God is the structure of reason itself. Although
the divine will is constrained by the structure of reason, God is not
constrained, because the structure of reason is not in any real sense
external to God. This is an intimation of something that will become
very important to Kant: transcendental freedom and autonomy. We see
it here first, albeit that it is enjoyed only by the divine mind.
Notes
References to Kant use the author-date system for the trans./edn used,
where applicable, and – with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason –
a reference to the Akademie edition, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer,
later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900– ). These references are prefaced by
an abbreviation of the title of the work, as set out below. Citations to the
first Critique are to the A (1st edn) or B (2nd edn) pages, as translated in
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason (CPR), ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Where available I use a standard
trans. All trans. by David Walford are from The Cambridge Edition of
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the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
LF Gedanken von der wahren Scha¨tzung der lebendigen Kra¨fte (1747).
Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces, my trans., 1: 1–182.
NE Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova delucidatio
(1755). New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical
Cognition, trans. Walford, 1: 385–487.
UNH Allgemeine Naturalgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755).
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, trans.
W. Hastie in edn by Milton K. Munitz (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1969).
PM Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali
cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam, quam consentiente
amplissimo philosophorum ordine (1756). The Employment in
Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry,
of Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology, trans.
Walford, 1: 473–87.
OM Versuch einiger Betrachtungen u¨ber den Optimismus (1759). An Attempt at
Some Reflections on Optimism, trans. Walford, 2: 27–35.
OPA Der einzig mo¨gliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes
(1763). The Only Possible Argument in support of a Demonstration of the
Existence of God, trans. Walford, 2: 63–163.
IC Untersuchung u¨ber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsa¨tze der natu¨rlichen
Theologie und der Moral (1763). Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness
of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals, trans. Walford, 2:
273–301.
1 Although God can choose whether or not to create a world at all, this does not mean
that God can choose which world to create, if God decides to create substances, and
to place them in connection with one another, thus constituting a world. In 1759 Kant
endorses the Leibnizian position that God chooses to create this world because it is
the best possible world (1992: 71–6; OM 2: 29–35). What matters for our purposes is
that Kant thinks that whether or not any created substances exist at all, and whether
they are connected so as to constitute a world, is subject to the divine will.
2 For extensive treatments of the importance of Newton to Kant’s pre-Critical philosophy,
see Cohen (1885), Friedman (1992) and Scho¨nfeld (2000).
3 For an extensive account of Kant’s intellectual context, to which I am indebted in this
section, see Watkins (2005: 23–100).
4 See Guyer (1987: 11–12). Guyer makes the suggestion that in the ‘principle of succession’
we see Kant anticipating the arguments of the Refutation of Idealism (B275–94).
5 For an interpretation of the principle of coexistence as a response to such a Leibnizian
position see Langton (2004: 107–23). In my treatment of the passage as directed at
Crusius, I am indebted to Watkins (2005: 140–9).
6 See Buroker (1981: 42), and Langton (2004: 101)
7 For a helpful survey see Francescotti (1999: 560–609). Attempts to capture the dis-
tinction revolve around notions such as ‘duplication’, the properties the substance
would have in any possible world (Lewis 1983: 51–70); ‘loneliness and lawlessness’,
the properties the substance would have if it were alone and unconstrained by causal
laws (Kim 1982: 51–70); and ‘independence’, the properties the substance would have
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whether or not it is accompanied by other substances (Vallentyne 1997: 209–19;
Langton and Lewis 1998: 333–45).
8 For a more extensive discussion, to which I am indebted, see Oakley (1961: 433–57).
9 See Kim (1984: 153–76).
10 For reconstructions and evaluations of the success of the proof for the existence of
God offered by Kant in this text, see Fisher and Watkins (1998), Adams (2000),
Scho¨nfeld (2000: 183–208), Wood (1978: 64–71), Chignell (2009), and Stang (2010).
For our interpretative purposes here, nothing hangs on the success or otherwise of
Kant’s proof. These discussions concern Kant’s claim that an absolutely necessary
being is required to ground all possibility as such. The issue of the relative priority
of the divine will or intellect in grounding possibility is not the focus of interest,
although Chignell (2009: 181) construes Kant along more intellectualist lines, and
Stang (2010: 281, 296–7) along more voluntarist lines. Stang interprets Kant’s claim
that ‘possibility is given as a determination existing within the real’ (2: 79) to mean
that possibilities are grounded in ‘God’s unlimited powers’ (2010: 281), and so that
‘what is possible depends on whaty [God] has the power to choose’. Stang gives two
reasons – contra Chignell – as to why this is not an inappropriately voluntarist
reading of Kant. First of all, Stang points out that his claim is not ‘that what is
possible depends on what God does choose but on what he has the power to choose,
and that depends on his nature’ (2010: 281). Secondly, Stang argues that the anti-
voluntarism expressed in Kant’s claim that ‘the will makes nothing possible’ (1992:
143–4; OPA 2: 100) is in fact directed at Descartes’s ‘infamous doctrine of the
creation of the eternal truths by God’ (2010: 297), whereby even the laws of logic and
mathematics are subject to divine command. As my discussion shows, Stang’s inter-
pretation is not supported by the text, as Kant immediately applies the claim that ‘the
will makes nothing possible’ to the essences of created substances, which make up, for
example, the earth’s atmosphere. As we have seen above, this is consistent with Kant’s
approach in UNH and NE. Whether God chooses to create x is indeed dependent
upon the divine nature – as Stang observes – but what is created when x is brought into
existence is dependent not on ‘God’s unlimited powers’, but on the essences of things,
which essences are in turn (non-morally) dependent upon the divine understanding.
11 Adams (2000) and Chignell (2009) discern a difference between Leibniz and
Kant here: for Leibniz, God grounds possibilities by thinking them, whilst for Kant,
God grounds all possibilities by exemplifying them (Adams 2000; Chignell 2009).
Stang (2010: 290–1) disputes this reading of Kant. For our purposes – of ascribing
essentialism and intellectualism to both thinkers – nothing turns on this dispute.
Although this would take further discussion, one might wonder what the supposed
distinction amounts to in the end: if, for Kant, possibilities are exemplified in the
divine intellect, then by virtue of divine omniscience, all possibilities would also
be eternally thought in the divine mind; and coming from the other end, if all pos-
sibilities are eternally thought by God, they could also be said to be exemplified in
the divine understanding. See Adams for an alternative suggestion as to how a
‘representation thesis like Leibniz’s’ might ‘lead to an exemplification thesis like
Kant’s’ (2000: 435–9).
12 As well as Mumford (2006) and Ellis (2001), see also Shoemaker (1980), Swoyer
(1982), Ellis and Lierse (1994: 27–45), Martin (1994), and Bird (2001: 267–74).
13 Mumford prefers to abandon talk of ‘laws’ in nature, whereas Ellis and Bird want
to retain the language, but to place it on a proper footing. Nonetheless, there is
considerable agreement even here: Ellis understands laws of nature to describe reg-
ularities that arise because of the dispositions and causal properties of substances,
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processes and events. On this basis, Mumford could accept talk of ‘laws of nature’,
as derivative upon dispositions, whilst denying that laws have a fundamentally
explanatory role in nature.
14 For a discussion of the history of the concept of ‘laws of nature’, see also Ruby (1995:
289–315).
15 Laywine is insightful on this point, arguing that in his Critical philosophy, Kant draws
on his ‘early general cosmology’, by assigning ‘to our understanding’ tasks that were
previously reserved for God, when conceived of as ‘governing universal interaction
among created substances’ (1993: 9–10).
16 I am aware of the complexities involved in applying the compatibilist/non-compatibilist
distinction to Kant: see Insole 2011b for a more extensive discussion.
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